Abstract
Introduction
Blind signature was introduced by D.Chaum [4] , which can provide anonymity of the signed message. It can protect the right of an individual's privacy. Since the first blind signature scheme was included, many blind signature schemes have been proposed. In [16] , T.Okamoto proposed the blind signature based on Schnorr signature and D.Pointcheval proved its security in [3] . In 1994, the blinding schemes [17] of the modification of DSA scheme and Nyberg-Rueppel message recovery signature scheme were presented by Camenisch. Because blind signatures [2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] can realize privacy protect of the user, it has been widely used in numerous electronic commerce security, most prominently in anonymous voting and anonymous e-cash.
Informally, blind signature allows a user to obtain signatures from an authority on any document, in such a way that the authority learns nothing about the message that is being signed. The most important property of blind signature differing from the other signatures is blindness, which requires that after interacting with various users, the signer S is not able to link a valid message-signature pair (m,) obtained by some user, with the protocol session during which  was created. The other property is unforgeability, requires that it is impossible for any malicious user that engages in k runs of the protocol with the signer, to obtain strictly more than k+1 valid message-signature pairs. Concurrency in the context of blind signature was put forth by Juels in [19] who presented the first security model for blind signature that takes into account that the adversary may launch many concurrent session of the blind signing protocol. It is of crucial importance to consider the security of the blind signatures, when a malicious user attempts to extract information about the signing key of the signer.
The basic idea of most existing blind signatures is that the requester randomly chooses some random factors and embeds them to the message to be signed. The random factors are kept in secret so the signer cannot recover the message. Upon the blinded signature returned by the signer, the requester can remove the random factor to obtain a valid signature.
In 1996, partially blind signature scheme [18] was introduced by Abe and Fujisaki. Before the protocol is executed, signer and user both agree on some piece of information, such as the expiry date. When a signature is verified, verification only works if user and signer agree on the same date. As soon as the user tries to change this auxiliary information, verification will fail. The first ID-based blind signatures scheme based on bilinear pairings was proposed by Zhang and Kim [13] in Asiacrypt 2002. Subsequently, the other ID-based blind signature scheme [14] was proposed in ACISP2003. They claim that the security against generic parallel attack to their schemes don't depend on the difficulty of ROS-problem [18] . In fact, their scheme [14] was also forgeable under the generic parallel attack if the ROS-problem is solvable, namely, [20] in the standard model. To the best of my knowledge, most of the existing blind signature schemes were considered in the singlesigner setting. However, sometimes, we need a blind signature in the multiple-signer setting. To overcome this problem, in the paper, to construct an efficient and secure blind signature for multiple signer, we give a novel blind signature scheme by combining multisignature with blind signature. And the security of the scheme is based on Modified generated bilinear inversion assumption. Finally, we also show the scheme satisfies the two properties of blind signature: blindness and unforgeability.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first present some background on groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps. Next, we give the definition and unforgeability and blindness of blind signature for multiple signers.
Bilinear Maps
Our blind signature scheme for multiple signers uses a bilinear map, which is often called a pairing, to implement a decision procedure for Diffie-Helmman problem. We briefly review the necessary facts about bilinear maps, using the following standard notation [14, 15] . 2 We note the modified Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves are examples of such admissible pairings. The security of the scheme discussed in this paper is based on the following security assumption.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G 1 be a cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p. Let g 1 be a generator of group G 1 . The computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) in G 1 is defined as follows: given 1 
Where the probability is over the random choice of generator g 1 G 1 , the random choice of a,b in Z p , and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition1:
We say that the (q,t,)-CDH assumption holds in groups G 1 if not t-time algorithm has advantage at least  in solving the CDH problem.
The security of our scheme is based on the hardness of the modified generalized bilinear inversion problem. Let us review it.
Modified Generalized Bilinear Inversion (MGBI)
Give h G 2 and the generator g G 1 , its goal is to find a point SG 1 such that e(g, S) = h, where e denotes the bilinear pairing.
Definition 2.
A blind signature scheme for multiple signers (for short BSM) can be described as a collection of the following four algorithms (protocols):
Setup. (sk; pk) ←KGBS(1λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on input a security parameter λ, and outputs system parameters params.
Keygen: It takes as input the common parameter params and returns the public key y i and private key x i of signer i. Any signer can independently run it.
Issuing Protocol. In the phase, multiple signers executes an interactive procedure with the user. Finally, multiple signers blindly issue a signature on message m for the user by this protocol, which is often divided into three sub-protocols or algorithms (Blind, MultiBSign, Unblind):
• Multi-Blind. Given the message m and a random string r, it outputs the blinded message m and sends it all signers. In this process, the user sometimes needs the interactive help from multiple signers.
• Multi-BSign. Given the blinded message m and the private signing key sk of signer i (i=1,2,|L|) as the input, it outputs a blind signature σi and sends it to the user.
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• Unblind. Given all received signature σi (i=1,2,|L|) and the previous used random string r, then the user outputs the unblinded signature σ.
Verify. Given a blind signature σ, a message m, all signer's public key y i (i=1,2,|L|) and params, this algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on m, or 0 otherwise.
In general, the security of a blind signature scheme for multiple signers consists of two requirements: the blindness property and the unforgeability of additional signatures. We say a blind signature scheme is secure if it satisfies these two requirements.
The blindness of a blind signature scheme for multiple signers can be described through the following game. Let A be a probabilistic polynomialtime adversary which plays the role of multiple signers, U 0 and U 1 are honest users. For all such A, U 0 and U 1 , for any constant c, and for sufficiently large n, the probability of A wins the games is as follows
Pr[ | To define unforgeability, let us introduce the following game among the adversary A which plays the role of the user and collude at most |L|-1 signers, and the challenger C which plays the role of the honest signer.
-Setup. The challenger C takes a security parameter 1 k and runs the algorithm Setup to generate common public parameters params and also the challenged signer's public/private key (Y i ,X i ). And chooses randomly private keys X j (j=1,,i-1,i+1,,n) to compute public key Y j . C sends params, the challenged public key Yi and public key/private key (Xj,Yj) (j=1,,i-1,i+1,,n) to A. (Note that we assume that the public keys of all signers are certified by certificate authority). -Queries. The adversary A can perform a polynomially bounded number of two kinds of queries in a concurrent and interleaving way as follows.
• Hash function query. If the security is analyzed in the random oracle model [6] , hash function is regarded as random model. C computes the values of the hash functions for the requested input and sends the values to A.
• Issue query. A chooses a plaintext m. To blindly obtain a signature on m with respect to the public key Yi and the public keys of the colluded signer, A engages in the blind signature issuing protocol with C in a concurrent and interleaving way.
-Forgery. A wins the game if A outputs a valid blind signature (m*, σ*) under the public key of the challenged user and the public keys of the colluded users.
Our blind signature scheme for multiple signers
In the section, we propose a novel blind signature scheme for multiple signers from bilinear pairings. It can provide the anonymity of the signed message under the multiple-signer setting. The new scheme is described below.
Setup: Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p. And gG1 is a generator of group G1. e is an efficiently computable bilinear map which satisfies e: G1 G1  G2 .H(.) is a hash function which satisfying H:{0,1}* G1Zp. Finally, publish system parameters ) (), , , , , (
KeyGen.: Let L be a signer set which includes all signers. For the signer i, it randomly chooses an element X i G 1 in group G 1 as his private key and computes the corresponding public key y i =e(X i ,g) .
Multi-BlindSign
Let m be the signed message, to obtain a blind signature on the message m under the signer set L, each signer i (iL) in the signer set L executes the following steps with a user. and sends R i to the user. 2. Upon receiving all R i from all the signer i in the signer set L, the user randomly selects two numbers
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Finally, the user sends hi to each signer i .
for i= 1 to |L|
after each signer i receives hi , it computes
Then, send Si to the user. If it holds, it means that the blind signature is valid. Otherwise, it outputs false.
Security Analysis
In the following, we will analyze the security of our proposed scheme and show that the proposed scheme satisfies correct , blindness and unforgeability.
Correction
To show the correctness of the proposed scheme, we only show that the produced blind signature (S,U) by the signers of the set L must pass the verification equation of blind signature. For a blind signature (S,U) on message m, since
Obviously, the produced blind signature by multiple signers can satisfy the above verification equations, thus, our scheme satisfies the correctness .
Remark: To verify the validation of our blind signature, a verifier only compute a paring operator, thus, our scheme is very efficient.
Security Proof
It remains to prove the security of the scheme. We will show our signature scheme is able to be against concurrent forgeablity attacks of a blind signature. Theorem 1: the proposed blind signature scheme for multiple signers is secure against the existential adaptively chosen message attack under the assumption of Modified generalized Bilinear inversion (MGBI) in G 1 is intractable in the random oracle model.
Proof. Given a forger
)-breaks our blind signature scheme for multiple signers, then we can construct an algorithm B which can make use of A to solve the MGBI assumption in group G. First, let us recall the MGBI problem: Give a random element h G 2 and the generator g G 1 , its goal is to find a point SG 1 such that e(g, S) = h, where e denotes the bilinear pairing.
Setup. B chooses public system parameters (G 1 ,G 2 ,g,e,q, H) , where the cryptographical hash function H behaves as the random oracle in the following simulation. Then B sets y * =h as the public key of the challenged signer. Without loss of the generality, we set y 1 =y*. And for i=2,,|L|, randomly choose 
3.
Finally, B returns (S,r) as the blind signature on message m. Output: Finally, B outputs a valid blind signature (S*, r*) on message m* with non-negligible probability . Note that m* has never make issuing query with message m*.
From the forking lemma due to Pointcheval and Stern [1] , by replaying A with the same tape but different choices of H, A outputs another valid signature (S*, r*), where r*=r*.
Then, we have the following relations: 
Then, it means that we can find an element S which satisfies e(S,g)=h. Obviously, it is in contradiction to the MGBI assumption. 
And the same theorem, we also have the views of the signer i for message M.
. In the following, we only find a pair (s 1 ,l 1 ) which satisfying
and S i =S 1 . Since for the following two equations, s 1 and l 1 are two unknown numbers
and
We know there exists a pair (s 1 ,l 1 ) to satisfy the above equations (1) and (2) .
Thus, we obtain a pair (s 1 ,l 1 ) which satisfying (Ri,Si, h)= (R 1 ,S 1 , h 1 ) It leads to the same relation defined in the blind signature issuing protocol for two different message m and M. That is to say, our scheme satisfies blindness.
Efficiency Analysis
From the above blind signature process, we find the size of a blind signature is independent of the numbers of signers and it only consists of an element in G 1 and an element in Zq. When using a supersingular elliptic curve over finite field n p F with embedding degree k=6 and the modified Weil pairing or Tate pairing [13, 14] , the length of an element in G 1 and in Zq can be approximately log 2 q bits, thus the total signature length is approximately 2log 2 q bits in our blind signature for multiple signers. In the elliptic curve cryptosystem, pairing operator is most timeconsuming. In terms of computation of signing generation and verification, no pairing operator is required in the whole blind signing phase. In the verification phase, only one pairing operators are needed. Thus, our scheme is efficient.
Conclusion
In this paper we first propose a novel blind signature scheme for multiple signers by combining multisignature with blind signature. Then, we give a formal proof of security for the proposed schemes in the random oracle model. And the scheme is proven to be concurrently secure based on the hardness of the Modified Generalized Blinear Inversion assumption. In terms of size of signature, the size of signature is independent of the numbers of the signers and only consists of two elements. Thus, our scheme is very efficient.
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